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The EU’s Eastern Partnership
What are the goals of the Eastern Partnership?
The Eastern Partnership (EaP), established in May 
2009, is meant to expand and deepen the existing 
Neighborhood Policy with the Caucasus states of  
Armenia, Aserbajdzhan, and Georgia, as well as with 
Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine. In comparison to the 
European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), this initiative 
is directed solely towards former Soviet countries in 
Eastern Europe. As such, it is a reaction to the French-
initiated Union for the Mediterranean, which seeks to 
develop closer relations to the neighboring countries in 
that region. The European Commission offers bilat-
eral negotiations to the EaP-participating countries 
on association agreements including the possibility of  
establishing a free trade regime. Other components 
comprise discussion over eased visa rules, border secu-
rity, and energy security. The Commission has delineat-
ed four key areas to serve in encouraging multilateral 
cooperation: democracy and good governance, eco-
nomic integration, energy security, and the promotion 
of  civil society exchange. Both Brussels and individual 
EU countries have repeatedly made statements assur-
ing that the initiative is not in any way directed against 
Moscow. While Russia is not a member of  the EaP, it 
could be involved in projects on a case by case basis. 
The target countries are to receive € 600 million until 
2013 for investment in state institutions and border 
controls, as well as for the support of  small business.
Poland and the EU’s Eastern Dimension
Before even receiving membership in 2004, Poland 
sought to create an Eastern Dimension for the EU, 
drawing on the Northern Dimension that Finland initi-
ated in 1997. This was motivated by the Polish concep-
tion that Poland could only be protected from Russia 
if  Ukraine was a fully sovereign nation and linked to 
the West and the EU. While Poland’s initial attempts to 
promote a new eastern policy for the EU were unsuc-
cessful, it experienced a breakthrough in cooperation 
with the Swedish foreign minister Carl Bildt at the end 
of  2008 – in part as a reaction to the Russian-Georgian 
war in summer 2008. Russia’s aggressive actions in 
Georgia and its unilateral recognition of  South Os-
setia and Abkhazia increased the will inside the EU to 
strengthen relations with its eastern neighbors. The 
problem with Poland’s approach turned out to be, 
however, that the original purpose behind creating an 
Eastern Dimension for the EU was to weaken Russia’s 
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influence in the region. Russia was thus from the very 
beginning not considered as a possible recipient of  this 
policy, in contrast to the Finnish initiative in the Baltic 
Sea. Without Russian involvement, however, the EU 
cannot create a serious eastern policy.
Sweden’s Role
It is thanks to the Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt 
that the Polish concept has received much attention in 
the EU and been widely discussed. When the German 
Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier dismissed 
the Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski’s call 
for a Polish-German initiative over the lack of  planned 
cooperation with Russia, the Swedish foreign minister 
seized the chance to work with Poland to give a fresh 
impulse to the EU’s new eastern neighborhood policy. 
The absence of  a Russian component was in fact an 
attraction for Carl Bildt, who has distinguished himself  
for years as a critic of  Russia. This attitude is further 
strengthened by Sweden’s objection to the planned 
Nord Stream pipeline, due in part to security concerns 
and fears of  environmental damage, and its criticism 
of  the human rights situation in Vladimir Putin’s Rus-
sia. Even if  the democratic and human rights situation 
in Russia has worsened over the past few years, anti-
Russian phobias and a policy of  isolation have little 
chance to reverse this trend. 
Nevertheless, the Eastern Partnership is practically 
absent from the agenda of  the Swedish presidency in 
the second half  of  2009, which is dominated by issues 
such as the economy and the environment. This dem-
onstrates a lack of  support for this project within the 
Swedish leadership. This may be due to a split between 
the foreign ministry, which co-initiated the Eastern 
Partnership, and the prime minister, who was not much 
involved in the process. This has the effect of  weaken-
ing the necessary further development of  the initiative.
Russia’s Reaction
If  the Russian leadership previously paid little atten-
tion to the ENP, this changed entirely with the de-
velopment of  the EaP. The Russian Foreign Minister 
Sergey Lavrov on multiple occasions condemned the 
establishment of  the Eastern Partnership without 
Russia’s participation and equated it to the establish-
ment of  an “EU zone of  interest in Eastern Europe.” 
On the one hand, Russia’s leadership reacted for tacti-
cal reasons more critically than was warranted. On the 
other hand, Moscow has indeed shown increased ner-
vousness in relation to EU initiatives on post-Soviet 
territory. Moscow’s excessive response to the Georgian 
attack in South Ossetia resulted in significant damage 
to Russia’s reputation throughout all post-Soviet states. 
None of  these countries has recognized South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia as independent states. In fact, the Rus-
sian aggression has made these countries seeking to 
bind themselves more directly to the West, especially 
to the EU.
Similarly, the Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict in January 
2009 led in the EU to a loss of  trust in Russia. The EU, 
by far the largest consumer of  Russian gas, has taken a 
number of  serious steps in the past months to develop 
a common EU energy policy that would reduce depen-
dence on Russia. The expansion of  energy coopera-
tion between the EU and its eastern neighbors—an 
important component of  the EaP—could have direct 
consequences for Russian projects. Moscow is also 
concerned by the rapprochement between the EU and 
Belarus, Russia’s traditionally most loyal ally. While 
there was once only limited contact between EU coun-
tries and Belarus, now Belarus is part of  the EaP and is 
expanding its economic ties to the EU. 
The Russian criticism against the EaP has not arisen 
because Moscow takes the EaP particularly seriously, 
but because it perceives the EU as an increasingly 
important player in the post-Soviet space. As such, the 
EU is beginning to be understood in Russian foreign 
policy as a competitor in Moscow’s traditional sphere 
of  influence.
Ukraine and the “eastern partners”
While the majority of  the countries targeted by the 
EaP welcomed the Swedish-Polish initiative from the 
beginning, first Moldova and then later Ukraine reacted 
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negatively. The Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin, 
who has since resigned, saw in the initiative a new, anti-
Russian CIS under the leadership of  the EU. Ukraine’s 
leaders based their increasingly critical stance towards 
the EaP primarily on the fact that the partnership 
grouped Ukraine together with other states that are far 
less advanced in their integration with the EU. Kiev 
fashions itself  as a regional power in terms of  rela-
tions with the EU and accordingly seeks special treat-
ment. The Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko had 
already criticized the ENP for lacking a path to EU 
membership for his country. For Yushchenko, this is a 
fundamental omission that the EaP only repeats. Even 
though bilateral negotiations are enshrined in the EaP, 
Kiev does not want to lose the advantage it has over 
other EaP members in the association negotiations.
The EU needs a new eastern policy
The EaP is a positive development, since it would give 
special treatment to the EU’s eastern neighbors. Events 
on the EU’s eastern border affect the EU more directly 
than is the case with many other countries involved 
in the ENP, such as Libya or Jordan. This became 
clear, for instance, during the gas conflict in January 
2009. The EU must therefore more clearly articulate 
its political and economic interests in regard to the 
EaP countries and involve these partners in an open 
dialogue. Merely hiding behind the classic EU formula 
of  “we support stability and prosperity” is not suffi-
cient for the development of  these countries as the EU 
would like to see it. The crises in Ukraine and Georgia 
and the rapprochement with Belarus demonstrate 
the need for a discussion about the political goals of  
the EU in Eastern Europe. For the first time in years 
there is the possibility of  directly involving Belarus in 
an EU project. The demonstrations in Moldova and 
the subsequent resignation of  the Moldovan President 
Voronin could set Moldova on a pro-European path.
A two-step approach is called for: firstly, relations to 
the target countries should be developed on an individ-
ual basis, and secondly multilateral projects should be 
pursued that integrate Russia. Furthermore, a concrete 
system of  incentives must be created within the frame-
work of  the new eastern policy that would promote 
reforms with additional financial assistance. The idea 
of  a civil society forum developed in the EaP concept 
signals a strong and important emphasis on social ele-
ments. The EU can successfully influence neighboring 
states only when it combines a civil society exchange 
with eased restrictions on visas and more travel free-
doms. Additionally, the dissemination of  knowledge 
about the EU and the European idea throughout 
the Eastern neighbor countries should be facilitated 
through an offensive information campaign.
The EU’s new eastern policy can only be successful if  
the split is repaired between those EU states that favor 
friendly relations with Russia (Germany, France, Italy) 
and those with more critical viewpoints (Poland, Latvia, 
Estonia). Russia is of  course an important factor in 
the political decisions of  the EU regarding its East 
European neighbors. At the same time, the EU states 
should not allow the development of  policy towards 
their eastern neighbors to be dominated by Moscow, 
but should rather take Kiev, Minsk, and Tiflis more 
seriously. The EU must develop policies and joint 
projects that can begin to address the problems found 
in the region. The EU’s eastern policy should not be 
used primarily to placate the domestic public under the 
mantra that “no prospect for membership is being of-
fered.” In this respect, the development of  EU policy 
towards its eastern neighbors begins within the EU 
itself.
Doing one’s homework
The eastern neighbors, and especially Ukraine, should 
abandon their fixation on EU membership, under-
standing that this is not a panacea for all of  their 
country’s ills and that it can only come as the result of  
tough negotiations. It is much more important for the 
elites in the neighboring eastern countries to under-
stand that EU policies target above all the domestic, 
and not foreign policy of  a country, and that the only 
way to EU membership is through internal reform. 
They must themselves create precedent and so sustain-
ably demonstrate their desire for membership. For 
this, these countries are in great need of  stimuli and 
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pressure from Brussels to begin the reform process. 
The long-overdue loosening of  visa restrictions for 
countries like Ukraine and Moldova could be used 
by the EU as a negotiating tool to support important 
domestic reforms. The self-conception of  Kiev would 
be helped by a clear statement by the EU on Ukraine’s 
membership in Europe. The target countries should 
not be offered a prospect for EU membership, but 
rather a political, economic, and social linkage to the 
EU in the framework of  a wide-reaching association 
agreement.
The EU and Russia
The EU and its member states must recognize that 
Russian politics do not follow the same logic as Euro-
pean politics do. Moscow does not view the increas-
ing influence of  the EU in its immediate proximity 
as a win-win situation, because it brings stability and 
democracy, but rather as a loss of  power and influ-
ence. It is of  no use to repeat continuously the empty 
claim that Russia benefits from this development. It is 
much more important to integrate Russia into concrete 
projects in the region in areas such as energy security, 
economic cooperation and environment protection.
On the other hand, it must be made clear to Moscow 
that the EU has interests in this region and does not 
recognize the exclusive spheres of  influence that Rus-
sia has claimed for itself. Russia’s attempts to influence 
and build alliances in its “near abroad” have failed in 
the past ten years. No country in the post-Soviet realm 
wishes to find itself  under Moscow’s sphere of  influ-
ence at least since the war between Georgia and Russia 
in the summer of  2008. The Russian political and 
economic model is not sufficiently attractive for these 
countries. While Moscow in the coming years will not 
be able to overcome this mentality, it must recognize 
the EU as an attractive competitor in the post-Soviet 
area that can also play a central role in modernizing 
Russia.
The EaP could serve as an important instrument in 
beginning the process that will lead to more straight-
forward and goal-oriented policies. It should be made 
clear to all participants that the EaP is the beginning 
of  a process that can lead to a new eastern policy if  
all the important players are actively incorporated, but 
that this is by no means inevitable. The EaP could fail, 
for example, if  the eastern neighboring countries do 
not take the offer seriously and use it instead as a mere 
tool to gain an advantage over Russia, or again if  the 
EU member states out of  self-interest do not further 
develop and promote the critical aspects of  the EaP. 
Germany should strengthen its engagement and act 
as an important motor for a new EU eastern policy in 
the framework of  the EaP. With its close contact to 
Moscow, Germany could be an important negotiator 
with Russia and send a clear signal to the EaP countries. 
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